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A

and B purchased from plaintiffs all of the stock of defendant corporation. Prior
to the transaction, and as a basis for negotiations, plaintiffs had an accountant
prepare a statement of corporate assets and liabilities, which showed that the
corporation was in financial difficulties. A and B acknowledged the corporate
indebtedness and took over the corporation. Later, plaintiffs brought suit
against the corporation on claims for salaries and advancements allegedly due
them from it, which claims had not appeared on the statement of corporate
liabilities. Held, the corporate entity would be disregarded, and plaintiffs
estopped from setting up their claims against the corporation. Paul v. University
Motor Sales Co., 283 Mich. 587, 278 N. W. 714 (1938).
As a general rule, a corporation is regarded as a legal entity, separate and
distinct from the individuals who comprise it.1 The application of this rule in
the instant case would necessitate a judgment for plaintiffs; for, strictly speaking, they in no way wronged or prejudiced the corporation by failing to
exhibit their claims on the statement of liabilities. Their misrepresentation
prejudiced only the purchasers of the corporate stock, who must, under the
above rule, be considered as separate from the corporation, especially since they
were not connected with it when the misrepresentation was made. For the
same reason, plaintiffs cannot be held estopped to set up their claims against
the corporation. But clearly the equities are against the plaintiffs in this situation. The liabilities of a corporation are material considerations to persons contemplating the purchase of its entire stock, particularly when the corporation
has a large deficit. It is axiomatic that a corporation can act only through its
agents, and since plaintiffs were the sole stockholders, A and B would seem
justified in relying on their representations. The court invokes the now common
exception to the general rule, that when the notion of legal entity is used to
defeat public convenience, justify wrong, protect fraud, or defend crime, the
law will regard the corporation as an association of persons.2 Courts in general
have seemed increasingly willing to utilize this formula to justify their disregard of the corporate entity in dealing with problems of corporate law.8
1

1 FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF PRIVATE CoRPORATIONs, perm. ed.,

§ 25 (1931); BALLANTINE, PRIVATE CORPORATIONS 8, 12 (1927).
2 1 FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA CoRPORATioNs, perm. ed., § 41 ( 1931), and cases
there cited. Perhaps the most generally accepted and cited statement of the proposition is found in United States v. Milwaukee Refrigerator Transit Co., (C. C. Wis.
1905) 142 F. 247 at 255. Another leading case is Majestic Co. v. Orpheum Circuit,
(C. C. A. 8th, 1927) 21 F. (2d) 720.
8 J. J. McCaskill Co. v. United States, 216 U. S. 504 at 515, 30 S. Ct. 386
(1910). The corporate entity has been disregarded in many varied situations: among
them, to prevent a corporation, not otherwise entitled to it, from bringing suit into
federal jurisdiction, Lehigh Mining & Mfg. Co. v. Kelly, 160 U.S. 327, 16 S. Ct. 307
(1895); to prevent fraud, J. J. McCaskill Co. v. United States, supra; to prevent
defendants from avoiding the effect of a statute of limitations, Linn & Lane Timber
Co. v. United States, 236 U. S. 574, 35 S. Ct. 440 (1915); to prevent rebates and
overcharges in violation of orders of the Interstate Commerce Commission, United
States v. Milwaukee Refrigerator Transit Co., (C. C. Wis. 1905) 142 F. 247; to
prevent evasion of the Clayton Act, United States v. United Shoe Machinery Co.,
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RECENT DECISIONS

Indeed, it would seem that the formula has been overworked to the extent
that in some cases courts have seemed perhaps too willing 4 to disrega.rd the
corporate entity, or "pierce the corporate veil," 5 apparently overlooking the
fact that the corporate form of organization, with its attendant attributes, 1§
well established in our law, and has long enjoyed the sanction and approval of
the courts. 6 It is safe to say, however, that in most instances where the theory
of separate personality has been disregarded, the results have been gratifying.
Certainly the principal case is one of these. For while, in a technical sense, as
pointed out above, the representations of plaintiffs to the purchasers of the
corporate stock cannot be said to have injured the corporation, or estopped
plaintiffs as against the corporation, a strict and literal adherence to the theory
of corporate entity here would constitute, in effect, judicial sanction of representations clearly false. It would represent the sort of judicial worship of legal
technicalities, as opposed to the dictates of plain facts and common honesty,
which has, on occasion, cast the legal profession into disrepute in the eyes of the
lay public. The position of the court in the principal case seems eminently just
and worthy of approval.

Collins E. Brooks

(D. C. Mo. 1916) 234 F. 127; to prevent evasion of tax laws, United States v. Barwin
Realty Co., (D. C., N. Y. 1928) 25 F. (2d) 1003; to prevent evasion of double
liability for bank stock, Metropolitan Holding Co. v. Snyder, {C. C. A. 8th, 1935)
79 F. {2d) 263.
4 It is believed that the most satisfactory position for courts to take on this
issue is well illustrated by the cases of Briggs & Co. v. Harper Clay Products Co.,
150 Wash. 235, 272 P. 962 (1928); and Peckett v. Wood, (C. C. A. 3d, 1916)
234 F. 833. In the opinion of this writer, the courts were too hasty in disregarding the
corporate entity in, for example, In re Burntside Lodge, (D. C. Minn. 1934) 7 F.
Supp. 785; and Clere Clothing Co. v. Union Trust & Savings Bank, (C. C. A. 9th,
1915) 224 F. 363.
5 The phrase is taken from Wormser, "Piercing the Veil of Corporate Entity,"
12 CoL. L. REv. 496 (1912); his book, THE DISREGARD OF THE CoRPORATE FICTION
AND ALLIED CORPORATE PROBLEMS (1927), contains an interesting discussion of the
general subject.
6 1 FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA CoRPORATIONs, perm. ed., §§ 1, 2 (1931); BALLANTINE, PRIVATE CORPORATIONS 1-5 (1927).

